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The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits
of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democ-
racy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.1
—President George W. Bush
Democracy [is] not viable in an environment of intense ethnic preferences . . .
Countries with extreme ethnic complexity experience high levels of deadly
political violence, which severely strains the fabric of their democratic orders.2
—Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner
The Bush administration is significantly lowering expectations of what can be
achieved in Iraq, recognizing that the United States will have to settle for far
less progress than originally envisioned during the transition due to end in four
months, according to U.S. officials in Washington and Baghdad. The United
States no longer expects to see a model new democracy, a self-supporting oil
industry or a society where the majority of people are free from serious security
or economic challenges, U.S. officials say. “What we expected to achieve was
never realistic given the timetable or what unfolded on the ground,” said a sen-
ior official involved in policy since the 2003 invasion. “We are in a process of
absorbing the factors of the situation we’re in and shedding the unreality that
dominated at the beginning.”3
—The Washington Post
I
On October 9, 2004, Afghanistan held a historic presidential election. Three
and a half months later, on January 30, 2005, the people of Iraq participated
in their first open election in 50 years. Both of these elections were of intense
interest to the United States and the Bush administration because they
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represented the initial recognition of a central aspect of the radical post-9/11
shift in U.S. foreign policy strategy and tactics—the aggressive pursuit of
global democracy.
A year after the tragic events of 9/11, the Bush administration published
the new U.S. national security strategy.4 This strategy was founded on three
critical elements. First, in order to prevent terrorist and other possible threats
to the U.S. homeland, the United States “will not hesitate to act alone, if
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively.”
Second, the United States will maintain instruments of power, including
“unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence”
to make it impermeable to challenge by any foe. “[O]ur forces will be strong
enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in
hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.” Lastly, the
United States will promote democracy worldwide. “[W]e will make freedom
and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral
relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other democracies while
we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better
future.”5
The U.S. policy of reserving the right to wage preemptive war as well as
other aspects of the new strategy met with resistance from many international
quarters. When compared to previous U.S. foreign policy experience, the
new strategy represents “an entire new set of ideas and principles” that chal-
lenges notions of multilateralism, self-determination, and sovereignty, as well
as one of the founding principles of the UN: no preemptive war.6
Additionally, the United States and its policy appear unable to translate its
position of global dominance into instruments that can effectively manage
various troubling parts of the international system.7
The purpose of this chapter is to focus on one aspect of the new national
security policy—the promotion of democracy—relative to that policy’s initial
test case in Afghanistan. Specifically, it examines a central component of the
U.S. promotion of democracy in Afghanistan—the presidential electoral
process as well as the meaning of its results to future democratic develop-
ment. The analysis of this case raises important questions as to the problems
facing the United States as it pursues the promotion of global democracy.
Politics in Afghanistan have traditionally been driven by local concerns.
Ethnic and sectarian identities define boundaries for Afghan personal and
group interactions and drive local concerns. Ethnicity and the issues that arise
from ethnic fragmentation are key challenges facing any nation-state that is
attempting to construct modern state institutions and norms. Those nation-
states with more than one ethnic group that still rely on tribal structures find
it more difficult to accomplish this task. This has been the case not only in
Afghanistan but also in Africa, Asia, and parts of Eastern Europe. As long as
groups within the state place more importance on their ethnic identities than
on their national ones, there will continue to be conflicting loyalties that will
greatly complicate national democratic development. As I argue later,
Afghanistan is a prime example of the way in which ethnicity can directly
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impact state formation and determine the success or failure of government.
How the United States addresses such concerns within its framework of
democratic promotion is critical. Critical theoretical issues concerning eth-
nicity and democratic development underlie the analysis.
E, S,  
D S F:
S T C
[Afghanistan] consists of a mere collection of tribes, of unequal power and
divergent habits, which are held together more or less closely, according to the
personal character of the chief who rules them. The feeling of patriotism, as it
is known in Europe, cannot exist among Afghans, for there is no common
country.
—Sir Henry Rawlinson, nineteenth-century British 
diplomat/colonialist8
According to Adrian Hastings, “nation, ethnicity, nationalism, and religion are
four distinct and determinative elements within world history.”9 They are core
concepts for every human and help guide individual and group motivations
while determining how these entities will react to certain situations. All four
are closely linked to each other, and as Hastings argues, it is difficult to separate
one from the others.10 History would clearly suggest that a society’s culture
and ethnicity could become dominant factors in the approach to state forma-
tion and ideas of governing. In tribal societies, ethnicity plays an even greater
role in the everyday life of individuals and their interactions with others.11
Afghanistan is a seemingly prime example of a society with ethnic cleavages that
represent significant obstacles to the creation of a democratically cohesive and
legitimate government.12 According to Diamond and Plattner, “ethnicity is
the most difficult type of socio-political cleavage for democracy to manage.”13
The underlying failure of many states plagued by ethnic fragmentation has
been the uneven inclusion of minority groups in the rule of government and
the government’s willingness to favor one ethnic group over another.14 These
ethnically charged relationships can lead to conflict within societies and form
an insurmountable barrier to democratic state formation.
Similarly, religion and sectarianism are important factors that help define an
individual’s identity and, in many cases, reflect directly on the individual’s eth-
nicity. Throughout history, religion has affected the creation of nation-states
and, in some cases, has even been the basis for forming a common bond
between different ethnic groups and forging unity when no other force was
capable of the task. Moreover, religion has produced the predominant charac-
ter of many states,15 such as Afghanistan. Today, the Middle East and Central
Asia illustrate this phenomenon. Islam has become directly tied to both eth-
nicity and nationalism and has helped form the state structures in the region.
Ethnicity and religion are important elements in the formation of a litmus
test to determine the probability of success for the creation of a stable and
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successful government. A national identity is often difficult to construct
among ethnically diverse nation-states. The national identity must supersede
ethnic loyalties in order to avoid infighting between competing groups vying
for political power. Today’s successful nation-states have populations that
have placed national identity before ethnic identity, whereas most failed (or
failing) states have remained ethnically defined, hindering the forging of
unity and cohesiveness among the populace.
There is little doubt that a major challenge for democracy, as well as the
Bush administration’s global pursuit of it, is ethnic conflict.16 Such ethnic
conflict may exist for a variety of reasons. Diamond and Plattner posit that
ethnic conflict erupts
because ethnicity taps cultural and symbolic issues—basic notions of identity
and the self, of individual and group worth and entitlement—the conflicts it
generates are intrinsically less amenable to compromise than those revolving
around material issues . . . they revolve around exclusive symbols and concep-
tions of legitimacy, they are characterized by competing demands that cannot
easily be broken down into bargainable increments.17
Hence, ethnicity is viewed as the individual’s and group’s identity and defines
their view of entitlement. This has clearly been a significant historical
dynamic in Afghanistan where the Pashtuns of the south have considered
themselves as the only legitimate rulers of Afghanistan and have been the sole
producers of kings and emirs that have ruled for the last 300 years.18
The underlying factor for the creation of ethnic conflict in the majority of
multiethnic societies has been the degree to which all parties are included in
the ruling structure of the state. In severely divided societies, ethnic identity
provides a clear line of demarcation as to who will and who will not be
included; these lines seem to be unalterable.19 If Horowitz’s theory is cor-
rect, then exclusion produced by ethnic differences is the single most difficult
barrier for multiethnic nation-states to overcome. “In deeply ethnically
divided societies, in contrast to other lines of cleavages, such as class or occu-
pation, the lines appear to be permanent and all-encompassing, predetermin-
ing who will be granted and denied access to power and resources.”20 Further
complicating this situation are the historical memories of these groups, pre-
dominantly those of the excluded or minority groups, and the resulting
deeply rooted animosity toward the ruling or historically dominant group
within the nation-state.21
Ethnicity and its possible conflicts become increasingly negative factors in
the implementation and development of democratic structures and ideals
within nation-states. As long as individuals value ethnicity more than nation-
alism and a struggle for power exists between separate groups, the chances for
the creation of a democratic government and civil society are less likely. This is
true not only in Africa, but also in the republics that were created after the fall
of the Soviet Union and in the Balkans. Given the chance, it appears that
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control of the political system. If so, then multiethnic societies that lack feel-
ings of nationalism are not conducive to forming democratic governments.
Tilly argues, “the absence of extensive kinship or tribal organization favored
the development of the nation-state in Western Europe.”22 Brinbaum and
Badie suggest, “Third World states generally face societies that maintain the
persistence of tribal or tribal structures, the crucial importance of kinship,
and the limited individualization of property rights in land.”23 Intense ethnic
identity is not conducive to the growth and development of democratic insti-
tutions that stress the importance of the whole populace over that of the indi-
vidual or the group. “[T]he tribe or ethnic group gives primary importance
to ties of kinship and patrilineal descent, whereas the state insists on the loy-
alty of all persons to central authority.”24
According to Rubin in his analysis of Afghan fragmentation, “democracy,
in the liberal tradition, consists of procedures for making the government
accountable to society so that society can govern itself by means of the
state.”25 He continues to say, “the inclusion of citizens in the polity’s institu-
tions and opportunities to contest power define a democratic regime.”26 If
the state shows preference to one group or another or includes only a certain
group, that group gains a larger share of the distribution of important mate-
rial and nonmaterial goods, including prestige. This increases the chance that
“ethnic politics” will slow the development of democratic structures.27
Another obstacle in developing and maintaining a multiethnic democratic
state is the sheer difficulty for any regime in promoting an all-inclusive gov-
ernment and superimposing it on an ethically divided society.28 Democracy,
as a concept, stresses majority rule, which in multiethnic societies means
there will always be groups that feel left out of the political arena. Successful
democracies build into their systems procedures and mechanisms that allow
minority groups to have a voice within government and thereby feel included
in the overall governing process. The primary shortfall of many states facing
ethnic conflict has been the ruling group’s failure to allow the sharing of
power with others within the nation-state.
A: T E   E
F S
Afghanistan is a country with a diverse ethnic composition that complicates
democratic as well as state formation. The present boundaries of Afghanistan
were created to serve as a buffer between the British and Russian Empires as
Afghanistan confronted modernity through its forced integration into an
Euro-centric state.29 These “virtual” borders were not drawn along ethnic,
linguistic, or religious lines, resulting in an externally imposed “state” com-
posed of a complicated mix of people who were mostly living in small, kin-
based communities outside of the limited urban areas. “The state was only
able to impose its will upon the tribes and occupy its own territory thanks to
the financial subsidies and weapons which were freely provided by the
English between 1880 and 1919.”30 Consequently, the Afghan people were
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embittered about modernity and all that it entailed. Complicating the situa-
tion was the adoption of this modernity process by many Afghan leaders in
recent history. In the end, according to Olivier Roy, it was not modernization
that failed the Afghans but the rulers’ notions of modernity. Simply put, he
argues, “it is not modernization which brings problems, but modernity, the
hypothesis which holds that modernity must necessarily involve a ‘cultural
revolution,’ a transformation of the way of thinking and adoption of new
social paradigms.”31
Along with modernity came new concepts to Afghanistan and its people,
both on social levels as well as on governmental ones. Ideas such as women’s
rights, separation of church and state, property rights, implementation of sec-
ular laws, and basic regulations, which historically were dealt with on the tribal
level, were now being forced from the center outward. In the end, modern-
ization was rejected by the traditionalist Afghans, mistaking it for modernity,
a social concept. This wholesale rejection led to the weakening of many
Afghan regimes, which were unable to propel the state from a draconian
mindset to a more ideologically advanced social structure and organization.
Power sharing also undermined many regimes throughout the last hundred
years of Afghan history. Rulers turned to various sociopolitically influential
groups (such as the ulema, the chiefs of the Pashtun confederation, or other
prominent personalities) that were in favor of attaining more direct control
and authority.32 This weakening of central power and its inability to co-opt the
powerful and influential segments of society further decreased the chances of
creating a lasting and fully independently operating state system. Afghans saw
that they were better off supporting their local leaders and tribal elites, who
provided them with security and economic relief, rather than supporting a
central government that was dependent on the same leaders and elites to sur-
vive. In the end, this cycle undermined both the state and local leadership by
creating a nonfunctioning government and establishing in the psyche of the
Afghan the notion that no modern state system can successfully govern by
bringing together both local and national level governing structures.
Currently, traditional legitimacy exists at tribal levels throughout
Afghanistan. It is based on the sanctity of traditions and the legitimate rule of
the tribal elders acting under those traditions.33 Traditional legitimacy is
effective at the tribal level, but will not be effective for the government of a
modern state. Much of Afghan society today, especially the rural areas of the
country, continues to live within the governing structures of tribes and clans.
Roy states, “the tribes see the state as existing on the periphery, responsible
for administering land whose boundaries are constantly fluctuating on
account of conquests carried out by the tribal confederations, in respect of
which the state is no more than the means of continuity.”34 Rubin further
develops this notion by suggesting, “the tribal model depicts tribes as largely
self-governing groups of people united by a ‘group feeling’ based on a belief
in common kinships[.] [W]hile the state claims authority over society within
a territory, a tribes claims jurisdiction over a set of persons bound by kinship
relations.”35 The tribes of Afghanistan see the central government as nothing
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more than a foreign and unfamiliar power trying to force control in areas of
society that traditionally are governed by tribal codes of conduct. Most tribes
and villages have remained self-sufficient and autonomous, accepting central
control only when in their material interest or when faced with overwhelm-
ing force.36
Tribal Makeup of Afghanistan
Today, Afghanistan is made up primarily of Pashtuns who would like to see a
strong and Pashtun-run central state, Tajiks who focus on power sharing in
the central state, and Uzbeks and Hazaras who desire recognition of their
identities and mechanisms of local government.37 Although some of these
groups are ethnically and linguistically distinct, they are not necessarily dif-
ferent in terms of culture.
Historically, the Pashtun tribes of the south, forming the largest demo-
graphic bloc within Afghanistan, have ruled and governed the country.38
Unlike other ethnic groups, the Pashtuns stress pronounced tribal structures
and codes at state expense. The Pashtun dominance of government has cre-
ated an atmosphere of tension between them and the remaining ethnic
groups in Afghanistan—mainly Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. These tensions
have led to conflict, as well as repressive measures to quell the power strug-
gle of these ethnic minority groups.
Minority ethnic groups have played specific roles within the society as a
whole and within the government. But not until the Soviet Union’s invasion
of Afghanistan did they truly gain power within the overall societal structure
and establish themselves as a political and military force that the Pashtuns
could no longer ignore. In the past, fighting for control of the state had
occurred primarily between Pashtuns (i.e., Durranis versus Ghilzais). But as
other ethnic groups rose in importance and made stabs at governing, a great
struggle arose within Afghanistan that eventually led to outright civil war and
the collapse of the Afghan government and state structure.
Since the beginning of modern Afghanistan, Afghan rulers have manipulated
ethnic groups in their attempts to control the state. For example, “to weaken
the Barakzais, Ahmed Shah, the ‘father’ of modern Afghanistan appointed a
separate khan for the Achakzais, making the clan into a separate tribe, a status
that they retain today.”39 Successful Afghan ruling authorities have been artful
in underscoring and exploiting the differences of these groups, including
encouraging conflict between them in order to maintain control. This manipu-
lation is similar to that during the British history in Iraq. In order to control
remote areas, the British identified points of contact among the tribesmen and
farmers in rural areas and effectively created tribal leaders. The government co-
opted the leaders for social status and other benefits of upper-class inclusion.
This “divide and conquer” technique further fragmented the society and less-
ened the likelihood of collective action among the tribes in Afghanistan.
Past attempts at Afghan modern state formation that have directly
challenged the local tribal and religious structures of society have resulted in
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ethnic backlash and state failure. The underlying problem for Afghanistan’s
governments has been their inability to create a sense of genuine national
unity in times other than crisis.40 This lack of nationalism, compared to the
deeply rooted ethnic identity the majority of Afghans feel, reflects the reality
of how difficult it is for ethnically fragmented societies to coalesce into one
unified front.
Further complicating the dynamics of Afghan society are the relationships
between the tribes themselves and between the varying ethnic groups that
compose the nation-state. Simply put, the relationship among tribes are gener-
ally marked by “competition and outright animosity,” according to Christie.41
The Bonn Agreement and Process
In December 2001 the precursor to Afghanistan’s first nationwide election
was held in Bonn, Germany, under the auspices of the UN Special
Representative for Afghanistan. The Bonn conference was organized soon
after it became clear that the United States and the Northern Alliance were
going to defeat the Taliban regime. The goal of this conference was to sys-
tematically map Afghanistan’s future.
After nine grueling days of meetings and deal-making between various
Afghan factions,42 a UN-brokered agreement was signed establishing provi-
sional arrangements for Afghanistan pending the reestablishment of perma-
nent government institutions. It established an interim government for
Afghanistan until a nationwide election could be held. Pashtun tribal leader
Hamid Karzai was chosen to serve as head of an interim power-sharing coun-
cil, which took office in Kabul on December 22. Karzai was clearly the U.S.
favorite for this position. Especially after the Taliban’s assassination of Abdul
Haq in the fall of 2001, Karzai was the one Pashtun leader with whom the
United States felt comfortable. Washington lobbied vigorously in Bonn to
secure Karzai’s position as the leader of the interim government.43
Although the Bonn Agreement—viewed by many as a “peace agreement”—
laid the groundwork for Afghanistan’s future political processes and institu-
tions of governance, it did not bring together the warring parties of al Qaeda,
the Taliban, and the Northern Alliance. Rather, Bonn coalesced Afghan
groups opposed to the Taliban and al Qaeda. Ironically, these factions were
also historically opposed to each other. Hence, although Bonn did represent
a new level of commitment and political will by both Afghans and major
powers and did establish the agenda and process for the establishment of per-
manent governance institutions, it did not attempt to resolve many root
problems, most notably Afghan ethnic fragmentation and distrust.
Moreover, as noted by some critics, Bonn codified de facto power rela-
tions, disregarding their legitimacy or illegitimacy.44 This was particularly
pronounced in the allocation of key ministries to the Tajiks and Northern
Alliance who, at the time of the Bonn conference, controlled Kabul in the
immediate aftermath of the Taliban’s demise.45 The Northern Alliance
received the three most powerful ministries within the interim government.
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Younis Qanooni, leader of the Northern Alliance’s delegation, was made
interior minister. The Alliance’s commander-in-chief, General Mohammad
Fahim, became head of the Defense Ministry, and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah
retained his position as foreign secretary. The 30-member cabinet included
11 Pashtuns, 8 Tajiks, 5 from the Shi’a Hazara population, and 3 Uzbeks.
The remaining three were drawn from other minorities. Northern Alliance
cabinet members appointed at Bonn were primarily ethnic Tajiks and former
militia leaders from the Panjshir Valley, base of the famed Afghan resistant
leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was assassinated on September 9, 2001.
Since the defeat of the Taliban, these Panjshiris have dominated the Afghan
security forces.
One could rightfully argue that neither the Bonn meeting nor the interim
government it chose was very representative of the demographics and tradi-
tional power centers in Afghanistan. In particular, relatively few Pashtuns
were given seats of power.46 Pashtuns assumed that this imbalance would be
corrected. They expected Karzai to shift the balance of power back their way
and give their former king a prominent national role. This did not happen.
Emergency Loya Jirga and the Resulting 
Transitional Government
A central component of the Bonn Agreement charted the course for the
future democratic elections to be held in Afghanistan. Section I (4) stipulated
that, in the meantime,
[a]n Emergency Loya Jirga [national political assembly] shall be convened
within six months of the establishment of the Interim Authority . . . . The
Emergency Loya Jirga shall decide on a Transitional Authority, including a
broad-based transitional administration, to lead Afghanistan until such time as
a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair elections
to be held no later than two years from the date of the convening of the
Emergency Loya Jirga.47
The Emergency Loya Jirga was also to elect a head of state for the transitional
administration.
On June 24, 2004, the Afghan transitional government and administra-
tion of Hamid Karzai were installed during formal ceremonies in Kabul.
Karzai had easily won the June 13 election at a national political assembly, or
emergency Loya Jirga called for by the Bonn Agreement. The Loya Jirga,
consisting of 1,500 representatives elected or appointed from 32 provinces,
debated the political future of Afghanistan over a seven-day period.
Two main issues concerning government composition faced the
Emergency Loya Jirga: the role of former King Zahir Shah and his represen-
tatives, and the role of the Panjshiris who have controlled most of the Afghan
security services in and near Kabul since the defeat of the Taliban. Both of
these issues were resolved in rather interesting ways.
East_06.qxd  17/03/2006  6:26 PM  Page 133
T J134
The former king’s support for the election of fellow Pashtun Karzai as the
Afghan transitional head of state somewhat diffused ethnic issues. Subjects
such as religion, the role of parliament, stability, and economic development
dominated the jirga debates. But, this dissipation of ethnic suspicions and
rivalry was short-lived, as Karzai would try to appease the various factions in
the cabinet appointments he made.
The most problematic and sensitive appointments were in the area of secu-
rity. Karzai renamed Mohammed Fahim, a leader of the Northern Alliance
forces based in the Panjshir Valley, as defense minister.48 Karzai further
strengthened Fahim’s position by appointing him as one of three vice presi-
dents. This move was a clear indication of the Tajiks’ power—as well as the
Northern Alliance—and signaled Karzai’s acceptance of the Panjshiris as nec-
essary partners in his militarily weak government. Karzai recognized that he
could not maintain stability during the fragile transition period without the
help of powerful factional leaders such as Fahim. However, the relationship
between Karzai and Fahim quickly became contentious and had the potential
to bring down the Transitional Government.
For all practical purposes there was only one key change to the interim
cabinet as a result of the loya jirga—the departure of Interior Minister Yunus
Qanooni, a Tajik.
Qanooni played a key role during the Bonn meeting in securing initial
support for Karzai’s candidacy among leaders of a powerful, Tajik-led politi-
cal and military coalition. The dismissal of Qanooni from the powerful inte-
rior ministry met with considerable controversy. When Karzai announced
Qanooni’s replacement was Taj Mohammed Wardak, an elderly governor
and ethnic Pushtun, Panjshiri soldiers and policemen in the ministry initially
resisted with roadblocks and work stoppages. Karzai recognized the implica-
tions of alienating the Tajiks, as well as the considerable military strength of
the Northern Alliance and especially the Panjshiris. He resolved the crisis by
appointing Qanooni as adviser for internal security, a newly created post, and
as minister of education.49
Fahim, Qanooni, and Ahmad Wali Massoud were all vying for the leader-
ship of the Panjshiris (Shura-i Nazar), and relations among them reportedly
were not good. The demands by Pashtuns for Karzai to reduce these men’s
power exacerbated relations, in particular between Fahim and Qanooni. Yet,
the basic reality was that, were it not for the U.S. and coalition presence, the
Panjshiris could replace Karzai anytime they wanted—and a lot of them were
chafing under the constraints of the coalition.
Karzai’s choice of cabinet members also clearly represented a compromise
between stability and change. Many Pashtuns expected that he would make
major changes to the interim cabinet chosen during the Bonn meeting by
removing factional leaders and appointing a balanced and professional cabi-
net more in line with the desires of the Pashtun community. Ultimately, this
proved to be an impossible task. The leaders of the Northern Alliance were
less than accommodating to change that would diffuse the considerable
power they had received in Bonn. The cabinet reflected Karzai’s recognition
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of the importance of striking a balance between the Pashtuns and Tajiks.
Karzai was intimately aware of this after leading Afghanistan’s interim gov-
ernment for six months in an uneasy partnership with leaders from the Tajik-
led Northern Alliance. He was faced with the extremely difficult task of
assembling an administration that would satisfy all major ethnic groups while
meeting the country’s desperate need for professional governance after years
of ruinous conflict.
The cabinet’s composition also highlighted the Pashtuns’ continuing dis-
organization and lacked a level of leadership acceptable to broader groups.
Considering that Kabul had traditionally been ruled by Pashtuns, the com-
position of the cabinet represented a significant shift in traditional power
relationships. But then, alliances and ideologies are fluid, one reason why
Afghanistan has had nothing resembling a stable central government for
much of its existence. Nevertheless, the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance
recognized their ability to achieve practical superiority over the Pashtuns
who, superior in numbers, had held them at bay for years. In the end it
appeared that the Loya Jirga’s main achievement was to lend legitimacy to
Hamid Karzai’s transitional government—an end-state seemingly consistent
with the desires of the United States and other international actors.
Alienated Pashtuns?
The new power of the Tajiks did not sit well with the Pashtuns and alienated
many in Karzai’s critical Pashtun power base. Whereas former king Zahir Shah
was named by Karzai as “Father of the Nation,” many Pashtuns were dismayed
and angered that none of his aides had been given senior posts.50 Other than
Karzai, very few Pashtuns held positions of power in the Afghan cabinet. In
July 2002, a Washington Post article titled “Pashtuns Losing Faith in Karzai,
U.S.”51 suggested that the Pashtuns were “becoming rapidly disillusioned by a
series of developments that have reinforced the power of rival ethnic Tajiks and
militia leaders, left the former king politically sidelined and a Pashtun vice pres-
ident assassinated, and subjected Pashtun villages to lethal U.S. air attacks.”52
Pashtuns reportedly did not feel welcomed in Kabul where the officials
they saw did not speak Pashtu. Padsha Khan Zadran, a powerful Pashtun
leader/warlord in the important Khost Province,53 summed up the senti-
ments of many Pashtuns when he asked, “Why are they humiliating
Pashtuns? We’re the majority. They placed Hamid Karzai at the top as a rep-
resentative of Pashtuns. But in reality he’s no longer a Pashtun. He’s sold
himself out. He’s a traitor. Pashtuns cannot sit around waiting. They will
react and will claim their rights.”54
A’ H O  E:
P  D D
According to the Bonn Agreement, Afghan national elections were to
be held on June 24, 2004 (“no later than two years from the date of the
East_06.qxd  17/03/2006  6:26 PM  Page 135
T J136
convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga”).55 These elections were to
determine Afghanistan’s president, and National Assembly and Provincial
Councils, all to be held concurrently.56 The presidential election was separated
from the other two most certainly because multiple provincial contests would
probably, “see an increase in factional violence as local power structures are
challenged and, in some cases, long-term rivals put in direct competition.”57
Electoral infrastructure delays, continuing instability, the claimed reemer-
gence of the Taliban, and Kabul’s lack of control over the rural areas eventu-
ally led to the postponement of the simultaneous elections. However, the
primary reason for the delay in elections was concern over overall security. In
particular, antigovernment activity and cross-border attacks from Pakistan
meant the situation was judged not sufficiently stable in June 2004 to allow
for free and fair elections. Eventually, the presidential election was postponed
until September 2004, and then once again rescheduled for October 2004.
The National Assembly and Provincial Council elections—viewed as a much
more complex undertaking than the presidential election—were also post-
poned.
In the spring and summer months preceding the presidential election, new
violence was witnessed, especially toward election workers. A poll conducted
for the Asia Foundation in July 2004 by Charney Research—a New York
polling firm, which also conducted a voter education planning survey in
Afghanistan—suggested that 81 percent of Afghans intended to vote. Afghans’
apparent
eagerness to participate was confirmed by the rapid progress of voter registra-
tion since May, when it began in the rural areas (home to four-fifths of the pop-
ulation). In three months, registration soared from 1.5 million to 8 million of
the estimated 9.5 million eligible voters. It continues at a pace of up to 125,000
per day, despite Taliban remnants opposed to the vote who threaten and even
kill registrants.58
Whereas Taliban threats drew the media’s attention, warlords and their
armed militias posed greater threats to the elections and people.
According to a survey of Afghan voters conducted by the relief organization
CARE, 87% said that the government should do more to reduce the powers of
Afghan commanders, and 64 percent said the most important way to improve
security was to disarm the militias. Only 17 percent said that Afghans would
face pressure on how to vote, but of those, more than 85 percent said the pres-
sure would come from commanders. Interestingly, only 0.84 percent said that
Islamic clerics would influence their vote.59
Threats to voters by regional power brokers were commonplace. For
example, in September 2004 in southeastern Khost province, elders of the
Terezai tribe announced on Khost radio that all tribe members must vote for
Hamid Karzai. Tribal families who voted against Mr. Karzai would have
their houses burned down.60 As suggested earlier, tribal elders, as well as the
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collective identity of the Afghan tribes, often determine the positions of
individuals.
Deference to tribe is a common attitude all across southern Afghanistan, where
the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, live. Individuals such as Sayid Amir, an
astrologer waiting for loaves of bread at a bakery in Qalat, know that the new
Afghan Constitution allows them full personal rights. But he still says he must
defer to his tribal elders with his vote. “It depends on our tribal leaders,” he
says. “Yes, I know it is my right to choose whom I want. But in my region, the
tribal leaders will all get together and choose whom they will vote for, and then
everyone will vote for that person.”61
Such a context with its accompanying behavior and attitudes is inconsistent
with Western concepts of democracy.
Eventually 9 million of the eligible 9.8 million eligible voters registered.
In fact, “in the provinces of Khost, Nooristan, Paktia, and Paktika, voter-
registration rates exceeded eligible voters by 140 percent. In 13 of the 34
Afghan provinces voter registration exceeded the number of eligible voters.”62
Voter registration fraud and voting irregularities were cited by many
observers. It is also worth noting that the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) refused to send election monitors to
Afghanistan because they believed that “the present conditions in Afghanistan
[were] significantly below the minimum regarded by OSCE . . . as necessary
for credible election observation.”63
Although the training and recruitment of election staff was slower than
originally anticipated, eventually, there were 4,807 polling centers manned
by a staff of approximately 120,000. Finally, on October 9, 2004, the presi-
dential election took place in an atmosphere of great anticipation. Eighteen
eligible candidates were listed on the Afghan presidential ballot. Around
eight million voters, some waiting in lines for hours, voted. Harmid Karzai
garnered 55.4 percent of the vote and his main opponents Yunus Qanooni,
Haji Mohammed, and Abdul Rashid Dostum received 16.3, 11.7, and 10 per-
cent, respectively. There were, however, complaints about voter intimidation—
especially in the Pashtun south and east—voting procedures, multiple voting,
and other counting irregularities in some areas. Also, 15 of the candidates ini-
tially called for the election to be suspended because of alleged fraud and
“intimidation by Mr. Karzai’s supporters, and [a] charge that the faulty ink
pens have made it possible for Afghans to vote multiple times.”64 Most of
these candidates eventually backed away from their complaints after a series
of meetings with U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.65 Eventually, an
Impartial Panel of Election Experts concluded that the outcome had not
been affected by these problems.66
Even with these controversies, the Afghan election was viewed by most as
a historic watershed event and a resounding success. High voter turnout, low
levels of violence, and the participation of women even in conservative
Pashtun southern areas pointed to many positives. The simple fact that the
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election was held was important considering that Afghanistan ranks at the
bottom of nearly all development indices, has no extended tradition of uni-
versal franchise, and has experienced almost a quarter century of continual
conflict in its immediate past.
But, there is an important question concerning the election. What do the
election results mean for the development of democracy in Afghanistan?
Evidently, the answer to this question is not clear.
Figure 6.1 presents two maps that seem germane to the answer. The upper
map in figure 6.1 represents a geographical breakdown of ethno-linguistic
groups in Afghanistan. As suggested by this map, the Pashtuns primarily
occupy the mountain belt that extends along much of the border with
Pakistan and the Registan Desert southwest of Kandahar. The Tajiks prima-
rily live in the eastern range of the Hindu Kush Mountains in the extreme
northeast of the country. The Shi’a Hazaras occupy the central Hindu Kush
range in the center of Afghanistan. Finally, the Uzbeks occupy the area east
of Badghis—both the desert of Faryab and its plain that extends northward
into central Asia (in the north and center of the country). When one
compares this upper map in figure 6.1 with the lower map representing the
provinces carried by each of the presidential candidates, an extremely
interesting pattern emerges. Considering that each of the four leading
Afghan presidential candidates belonged to a different ethno-linguistic group—
Karzai (Pashtun), Qanooni (Tajik), Mohaqiq (Hazara), and Dostum (Uzbek)—
the maps track ethnic representation quite nicely. Unlike a two-colored
American electorate map, Afghanistan’s has four hues. Intuitively, it appears
that the results of the Afghan presidential election merely reify traditional
ethnic splits in the country.
In order to more explicitly explore the notion that the results of the pres-
idential election primarily reflect long-standing ethnic divisions, provincial
election data for each of the four leading candidates was gathered. Data was
also collected for each of the 34 Afghan provinces relative to their ethnic
breakdown or composition.67 Correlation analysis was then performed on
these data representing provincial voting results and provincial ethnic com-
position. The correlation results of this analysis are presented in table 6.1.
The results are telling. The analysis clearly supports the notion that the
results of the Afghan presidential election represent and reflect historical ethnic
patterns that have long driven conflict dynamics in the county. No candidate
received significant support outside of his particular ethno-linguistic group.
As can be seen in table 6.1, each ethnic group voted for the explicit candi-
date from their own group, with correlations (r) of ethnic parochial voting
ranging from between .84 and .91. These results are statistically significant
with a p .0001 meaning that these results could not have occurred ran-
domly. Whereas such an analysis does not imply causation, it does suggest
clearly that traditional ethnicity remains at the forefront of Afghan politics, at
least as represented by recent presidential voting patterns.
An examination of table 6.1 also indicates other notions of the vital impor-
tance of ethnicity in Afghan politics and governance. It is interesting to note
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Figure 6.1 Afghan ethno-linguistic groups and Afghan October 2005 Presidential Election
results.
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not only the high positive correlations between the different ethno-linguistic
groups with their respective ethnic candidate (represented by the correlation
results in the table’s diagonal), but also the negative correlations that show
the candidates for whom the various ethnic groups were not likely to vote. The
Pashtuns have significant negative correlations (r  .44–.54) relative to
their probability of supporting a candidate from a different ethnic group.
The chance of a Pashtun voting for any of the other candidates was indeed
very slight and reflected their solidarity in voting patterns. Likewise, the
Tajiks had a very slim chance of voting for a Pashtun (r .54 with a p .001).
These results suggest that the two most influential Afghan ethno-linguistic
groups—traditional rivals—will not only vote for their own candidate, but
also against the other. This is not an encouraging finding for the success of a
strong presidential system based on the primacy of one ethnic group in def-
erence to others. In fact, it has been argued that a strong presidential system
can actually be a recipe for disaster in countries such as Afghanistan where
political elites are deeply divided, for it effectively permits only one winner,
while potentially generating many disgruntled losers.68
The Afghan governmental system mapped by the Bonn Agreement could
fail miserably if Karzai were to take advantage of the opportunity of his pow-
erful office to advance the causes of his own ethnic group, the Pashtuns. This
would be disastrous for Afghanistan. Not only would it likely reinforce fac-
tionalism and deepen the rifts between ethnic groups, but also eventually
result in civil war or secession.
This analysis suggests that Afghanistan faces an extremely difficult
challenge: how to unify its fragmented society and foster the development of
a national identity while each ethnic group continues to attempt to gain a
foothold in government, sometimes at the expense of other groups. This
ethnic approach, rather than a regional or national one, will continue to
fragment society until one dominant ethnic group controls all of the
governmental power or ethnic politics will make way for increased internal
conflict.
As the analysis above bears out, the presidential election appears to have
been more procedural than substantive. With Afghan ethnic groups voting
Table 6.1 Correlation coefficients (Pearson r) for Afghan presidential candidates at the
provincial level
Ethno-linguistic provincial votes received (%)
Pashtun Tajik Hazara Uzbek
Hamid Karzai .88 (p .0001) .44 (p .01) .45 (p .01) .54 (p .001)
Yunus Qanooni .54 (p .001) .84 (p .0001) .14 (p .42) .01 (p .96)
Haji Mohaqiq .34 (p .05) .20 (p .26) .91 (p .0001) .06 (p .72)
Rashid Dostum .45 (p .01) .10 (p .58) .14 (p .41) .88 (p .0001)
Note: SAS 9.1 procedure “proc corr” was used to produce the Pearson Correlation Coefficients (n  34).
Thanks to Adrianne Casebeer for assistance with the correlational analysis.
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mostly along ethnic lines rather than crossing over to candidates from other
ethnicities, the election made little headway toward uniting the divided coun-
try behind a single candidate. Although Karzai was elected with a majority of
the overall vote, he was not elected with a majority of the vote within any eth-
nic group outside his own, the dominant Pashtun. Hamid Karzai’s claim that
he is a truly national candidate that has support across ethnic lines is not
borne out. Less populous, but no less important, ethnic groups such as the
Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Turkmen did not “forget” their own interests
and vote for Karzai in an attempt to unite the country.
Although the American administration assumes the election of an Afghan
president is the first step on a path toward democracy, ethnic divisions, unless
properly addressed, threaten to derail any long-term hope of a democratic
Afghanistan. Unwilling to vote outside ethnic boundaries and come together
in compromise, Afghan citizens have begun a voting trend that does not
portend well for any future parliamentary government.
The burden falls on the political elites to reach compromise independently
or face continued intractability on all ethnically divisive issues, which in
Afghanistan translates as almost all daily business. Rather than letting the sit-
uation deteriorate, the elected leaders must reach compromises that are
mutually and constitutionally guaranteed, so those minority groups feel
vested in the various government institutions.69 On issues that include rather
than exclude them, Afghan minorities will demand compromise. Additionally,
changes should come from the bottom up. Inherent here is the belief that
government is most effective when it is open to its citizenry. If the citizenry
views the government as ineffective, they will have no incentive to participate
and will come to view the government negatively.70
All is not bleak, however. Afghanistan does have two major factors in its
favor for democratic development. First, it is a multiethnic society composed
of a handful of groups rather than two opposing forces. With four major eth-
nic groups, the Afghan polity has many sources from which to form coalitions
to bridge the ethnic divide.71 Second, the timing of the government-building
process allows each group to enshrine collective rights that will protect polit-
ical interests and share economic ones.72
C
While the United States pushes Afghanistan toward a democratic government,
not just in name, but also in practice, the Bush administration would be well
advised to look closely at the complexity involved in building a lasting
democracy in ethnically divided Afghanistan. In a society fragmented by eth-
nic groupings where concerns over rights of the group dominate the rights of
the individual, a Western-style liberal democracy, designed to promote and
protect individual rights, is viewed as doing little to address to the needs of
the groups.73 Indeed, as Horowitz points out, young democracies often fall
victim to the problems of their past as they appropriate colonial institutions
or Western constitutional provisions, neither of which takes into account the
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reality facing the new nation.74 In Afghanistan’s case, addressing the ethnic
divisions that permeate the country is paramount if democracy is to take hold.
Rather than endorse a procedural democracy that only highlights the
completion of events, such as elections, the Bush administration must force
the Afghan government to address the issues that divide the citizenry with
earnest concern and grave attention.
Over the past 100 years, national politics have not been of much concern
to the ordinary Afghan who made decreasing the state’s influence at local lev-
els his number one priority.75 This constant deflection of central authority in
the everyday lives of Afghans allowed traditional governing structures to
remain largely intact and slowed their evolution to more modern structures.
As the central government fought to gain access to these local structures, it
was met with increased resistance and eventual revolt. The cycle repeated itself
through many different Afghan regimes using varying models of government.
The challenge facing the current Afghan government is the task of uniting
the Afghan people while not repeating the mistakes of the past. The concept
of national identity needs to be bolstered, but not at the expense of marginal-
izing ethnic traditions and norms that are deeply valued by the Afghan people.
As long as people are divided by ethnicity or religion, there will be injustice,
corruption, and discontent. The goal in every budding democracy should be
to create a strong sense of national identity above all else. Governments must
foster the common identity and remove all ethnic and religious aspects of gov-
ernment. In Afghanistan, Shi’a, Sunni, Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara
leaders must fully cooperate in a quest for unity. It is only then that all citizens
will achieve a common sense of national belonging and democracy will be able
to thrive. In the end, this tightrope act will determine whether or not
Afghanistan succeeds in forming a modern nation-state with democratic
institutions and a large civil society.
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